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Abstract
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the mar-
riage problem called "the roommate problem". And, they showed that unlike
the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In
other words, the stability theorem fails for the roommate problem.
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for the roommate problem. The
mechanism is successful in determining the reason of instability in our game
scenario. And, we show that our mechanism implements the full set of stable
matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal
matching in the instance of instability.
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1 Introduction
In their seminal paper, Gale and Shapley (1962) described the well known
roommate problem. In the problem, there are even number of college boys and
dormitory rooms for the pairs of boys. Each boy has a preference ordering
over the other boys. The objective is to allocate the boys to these rooms in
pairs. Gale and Shapley showed that the stability theorem does not hold for
the roommate problem by giving a counter-example in their paper.
Knuth (1976) showed that multiple solutions could exist for the roommate
problem, like in the marriage problem. In his 12 famous questions, which he
raised during the lectures at the University of Montréal in 1976, he asked for an
e¢ cient algorithm to nd a stable solution for the roommate problem.
Irving (1985) proposed an algorithm for the roommate problem. The algo-
rithm has two phases. The rst one is similar to Gale and Shapleys algorithm.
Instead of simulaneously, the proposals are made sequentially. At end of the
rst phase, a deletion process takes place. Basically, the unachievable agents
for the proposers and the worse agents for the deciders than the current mates
are deleted from the preference lists of all agents. Whether the original prefer-
ence prole has no stable solution or has one or more stable solutions could be
determined from this reduced form of the preference prole. If there exists a
preference list without any agent, then it means that for the original preference
prole there is no stable solution. If all the lists contain only one agent, then
the prole has a unique stable solution. If some preference lists contain more
than one agent, the algorithm proceeds with the second phase which involves
further deletions. The second phase ends up with a unique stable matching, in
the existence of multi stability, since the algorithm breaks the cycles among the
agents. Thus, his algorithm tells whether a given prole has a stable solution
or not and if there exists some, the algorithm nds one.
2
Tan (1991) proposed a criterion which is a necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tion for the existence of stability; namely, as he calls, the non-existence of odd
party. He showed that the existence of the so-called odd party is the reason of
instability for the roommate problem. He also proposed an algorithm which is
a modied version of Irving (1985). The rst phase is again a propose-reject
process. After the deletion of impossibility agents at the end of the rst phase,
if every person has zero or one entry on the lists, then this leads to a unique
stable matching. If there exists a person having more than one agent in his
list, the algorithm proceeds to the second phase. The second phase continues
with the elimination of the cycles. If the elimination of a cycle makes some lists
emtpy, it indicates an old party, which signals an instability solution for the
original preference prole.
Tan and Hsueh (1995) proposed a new algorithm to the problem. In their
paper, the preference orderings are allowed to expand. In their model, they
make the analysis of a new comer to the game or a leave of an agent on the
existence of, as Tan (1991) calls, the stable partitions and how to nd one (stable
matching). When there is a new comer, he proposes to the agents according to
his preference orderings. They describe the proposal sequence, the positions of
the new comer(s) (one by one in an order) among the old agents and the number
of new members to maintain the stability of the preference prole. Stability is
maintained as long as there is no new "odd parties" if the initial prole does
not have any or all the odd parties are eliminated if starting preference prole
has some.
Cechlarova and Fleiner (2005) proposed a model for the roommate problem
with parallel edges. That is two agents are matched with di¤erent issues at the
same time. They show an equivalence with this model to the original roommate
problem and they proposed an extension of Irving (1985) to seek stability. The
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main di¤erence is that after the algortihm eliminates the rotations in the second
phase, it returns back to the rst phase. So, it has more complexity than the
original algortihm of Irving (1985).
In this paper, we propose a simple mechanism for the rommate problem for
strict preferences. We simply extend the mechanism proposed in Evci (2014).
The problem here is that his mechanism is designed for the two-sided matching
games. But, the roommate problem has a one-sided framework. Hence, rstly
we convert the model of the roommate problem into a two-sided game by using
auxiliary functions, and then we apply the mechanism by Evci (2014) to this
modied market. We show that the mechanism nds a/the stable matching
in the existence of stability and ends up with Pareto optimal matching in the
absense of stability. And, we also describe the method to the multi stability
case by using our mechanism. In other words, we show how to fully implement
the set of stable matchings for any preference prole in the existence of stability.
There is a literature on the domain restrictions to obtain stability for any
preference prole and also a literature analyzing the restrictions on the collegues
for the two-sided matching markets. But, these are out of the scope of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the preliminaries.
In Section 3, we present the mechanism of Evci and our renement with its
stability analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 Basics and Examples
"The Roommate Problem" is one of the most interesting examples of match-
ing theory. The problem was proposed rstly by Gale and Shapley (1962). In
the roommate problem, we have two nite sets; there are 2n college boys and n
dormitory rooms. Each boy has a preference ordering over the other (2n   1)
boys. The objective is to allocate these boys to the rooms in pairs.
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Let B = fb1; :::; bkg be a non-empty sets of agents (e.g. college boys). Each
agent has a strict preference ordering R over the other agents of the set; for
example Rbi is the preference ordering of bi 2 B over B=fbig. For any bi; bj ; bk 2
B, bjRbibk means bi prefers bj over bk. A Preference Prole R = RB = (Ri)i2B
is a set of preference orderings, one for each agent in the model. Let < be the
set of all preference proles.
rbj (bi) is the rank of agent bi 2 B in the preference ordering of agent bj 2 B.
For example, rbj (bi) = k means that bi is the k
th best roommate for bj .
A (one-sided) matching  : B ! B is an injection. For any bi; bj 2 B,
(bi) = bj means that bj is the match of bi and vice versa. Here we explicitly
assume that no agent remains single in the matching; that is @bi 2 B such that
(bi) = bi. B is the set of all matchings among the agents of B.
Let x; y 2 B be two matchings and bi 2 B. We can rank matchings, from
the point view of agent bi, according to how bi ranks the agents he is macthed
with. If x(bi)Rbiy(bi), then we say that for agent bi, x Pareto Dominates
y: If x(bi) = y(bi), then bi is indi¤erent between x and y and we denote
this by xIbiy. (In this model, we work under strict preferences).
For any preference prole R = RB = (Ri)i2B and a matching , for any
bi; bj 2 B, (bi; bj) =2  is called a blocking pair, if bjRbi(bi) and biRbj(bj). If
there is no blocking pair for , then we say  is stable; otherwise, it is unstable.
A Matching Mechanism  is a procedure to select a matching from every
preference prole. Formally
 : <  ! B .
In their paper, Gale and Shapley (1962) give a counter example which shows
that the stability theorem, which holds for the marriage problem, fails for the
roommate problem. They say "...consider boys , ,  and , where  ranks
 rst,  ranks  rst,  ranks  rst, and ,  and  all rank  last. Then
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regarless of s preferences there can be no stable pairing, for whoever has to
room with  will want to move out, and one of the other two will be willing to take
him in...". We shall demonstrate their example with the following preference
prole R1,
R1 =
a b c d
b c a c
c a b b
d d d a
where N = fa; b; c; dg be the set of boys and N = f1; 2; 3g be the set
of all possible matchings, where
1 = f(a; b); (c; d)g,
2 = f(a; c); (b; d)g,
3 = f(a; d); (b; c)g.
None of these matchings is stable for R1; 1 is blocked by (b; c), 2 is blocked
by (a; b) and 3 is blocked by (a; c). So, in this one-sided game, we observe
unstable solutions as well as the stable ones.
3 The Mechanism
In this section, we present our mechanism which is basically a renement
of the mechanism by Evci (2014).
3.1 The Dynamic Mechanism by Evci(2014)
Evci (2014) proposed a dynamic mechanism for the two-sided matching
markets under strict preferences.
Let M = fm1; :::;mkg and W = fw1; :::; wlg be two non-empty, nite and
disjoint sets of agents (e.g. men and women).
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The mechanism is designed for, as he calls, the semi-centralized market form.
While the matching process is centralized for one side of the maket, it is decen-
tralized for the other.
For a given matching game R = (Ri)i2M[W , one side is assigned as the
Restricter, and the other side as the Chooser. The preferences restricters are
regarded as the restrictions or the priorities on the chooser side. The choosers
make decisions simultaneously at the preferences of the restricter side.
Without loss of generality, he assigns M as the restricter and W as the
chooser sides and he shows that set of the outcomes does not depend on which
set is the restricter or the chooser side.
We start with the best women in view of some men. These women are called
to decide; either to say "yes" or "no" to men who propose to them. If a woman
says "yes" to a man and accepts his o¤er, then they form a pair and both of
them are deleted from the prole; if she says "no", she loses that man forever
and waits for her turn for other men. At the end of the rst step, all agents are
informed about the results.
The second step continues with same scenario. And, so on.
Now we give the game scenarios of his mechanism.
Denition 1 Let w 2 W be any chooser agent and mi;mj 2 M be any two
restricter agents with rmi(w) > rmj (w) and wiRmwj. If at the step k = rmj (w)
non of mi and mj have been taken by other choosers yet, then we say the agent
w experiences a conict between agents mi and mj.
The denition says that for a chooser if the o¤er of a restricter comes before
any better one, then the chooser agent experiences a conict.
Denition 2 If a chooser agent w 2 W does not experience any conict, then
we say w has a smooth game.
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The focus of his paper is for the special case of the conicts.
Denition 3 Let fm1; :::;mrg M be a set of restricters and fw1; :::; wrg W
be a set of choosers. If we have such a case;
 w1Rm1w2, w2Rm2w3,...,wrRmrw1;
 m1Rw2m2,...,mr 1Rwrmr;mrRw1m1;
 rm1(w1) = rm2(w2) = ::: = rmr (wr) = k (for at least one side),
Then, agents of fw1; :::; wrg experience a cyclical conict with each other
for the agents of set fm1; :::;mrg at step k.
His rst existence result is on the relationship between the cycles and multi
stability.
Theorem 4 For any given preference prole R = (Ri)i2M[W , there exists only
a unique stable matching if and only if there exists no cyclical conict for the
choosers.
This theorem explains the reason of multi stability for any preference prole.
He then presents the types of cycles under his game scenarios in a preference
prole. In the proof of theorem, he also showed that Nash Equilibria for a single
cycle generates two stable matchings.
Denition 5 Let M and W be the sets of restricters and choosers, respectively.
Let W1;W2 W be the set of the agents of two cycles. If W1\W2 = ;, then we
say that the cycles are independent. Otherwise, they are (inter) dependent.
His next result is on the relationship between the number of stable matchings
and the number of cycles in a prole.
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Proposition 6 Two (inter) dependent cycles generate three stable matchings.
From Proposition 6, the idea saying that "each cycle produces two stable
matchings" fails. Unfortunately we cannot know further about this relationship
between the number of cycles and the number of stable matchings, because of
the common agents in the existence of several dependent cycles for a preference
prole.
And, nally next theorem explains the "partial order structure" of stable
matchings.
Theorem 7 For any preference prole, there exist independent cyclical conicts
which occur at the same step k if and only there exist incomparable stable
matchings.
His next theorem is on the implementation of stable matchings.
Theorem 8 If Nash Equilibria of the cycles are chosen, mechanism  imple-
ments the full set of stable matchings for any preference prole. In other words,
we always end up with one of the stable matchings for any prole.
He also shows that truth telling is weakly dominant for the choosers.
3.2 The Renement of the Mechanism
Mechanism  in Evci (2014) is designed for the two-sided matching mar-
kets. Therefore, we should modify either the mechanism or the structure of the
roommate problem. In this paper, we stick to the mechanism and we convert
the roommate problem into a two-sided matching problem. Thus, we need a
method to separate the set of boys N into two disjoint sets. For this purpose,
we benet from a well-known social welfare function.
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Denition 9 Let A be a set of alternatives, with Card(A) = m, and N be a
set of agents, with Card(N) = n. Each agent has a strict preference ordering
R over A, e.g. 8i 2 N , Ri is the (strict) preference ordering of agent i over the
set of alternatives A. Let R = RN = (Ri)i2N be a preference prole and < be
the set of all preference proles.
A Social Welfare Function (SWF) f : R  ! R gives the social preference of
the society N over the alternative set A, where R 2 <.
This is the usual denition of a social welfare function. Next, we give the
denition of a famous SWF, which is one of the Scoring Rules.
Denition 10 In a preference prole, the Borda Score BS(a) of an alternative
a 2 A is BS(a) = P
i2N
[(m+ 1)  ri(a)]. In a voting system, the Borda Rule as
a SWF, ranks the alternatives according to their Borda Scores. We allow weak
orders in the social preference.
And, this is the usual the Borda Rule denition. In the roommate problem,
since there is no alternative set, we modify the deniton of the Borda Rule to
this game. Now, we will show this modication with an example.
Example 11 Let N = fa; b; c; d; e; fg be the set boys with preference prole R2,
R2 =
a b c d e f
b c d a a b
c d a b b a
d a b c c c
e e f f d d
f f e e f e
5 points
4 points
3 points
2 points
1 point
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Now, we shall compute the Borda scores of the agents.
B(a) = 0 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 5 + 4 = 21
B(b) = 5 + 0 + 3 + 4 + 4 + 5 = 21
B(c) = 4 + 5 + 0 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 18
B(d) = 3 + 4 + 5 + 0 + 2 + 2 = 16
B(e) = 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 1 = 7
B(f) = 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 0 = 7
From these scores, we get the Borda ranking of the set of boys and together
with the preference prole we have,
R2 =
a b c d e f B(R2)
b c d a a b ab
c d a b b a c
d a b c c c d
e e f f d d ef
f f e e f e
Since the mechanism in Evci (2014) is called , we shall denote ours by .
 is dened over any preference prole R and its Borda ranking B(R) into the
set of matchings N . Formally,
 : (R; B(R))  ! N .
Now, we describe how our mechanism works here. We use the Borda ranking
of the preference prole to convert the game into two-sided case; that is we use
it to generate two sides of the market. The Borda ranking gives the order of
the agents that will be the restricters in all successive stages of the game.
We assign the rst agent in the Borda ranking as the restricter of the rst
stage. Then, all the other agents take place in the chooser side. If there is more
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than one agent at the top of the Borda ranking, we randomly break the tie and
assign the top agent as the restricter. Then, we run mechanism .
Claim 12 At the end of the rst stage, we get a pair which consists of the
restricter and one of the choosers.
Proof. The proof is easy. Since the restricter is (one of) the top agent(s) in
the Borda ranking, he is (one of) the favorite agent(s). If there exists a chooser
agent whose best agent is the restricter, then they form a pair which is trivial
to show.
So, let us assume that there is no agent whose best agent is this restricter.
This is possible under the Borda rule. If all the choosers reject, then we get an
unstable matching (in the existence of stability) which is against the rationality
of the agents. Since there is only a single ordering, the choosers do not confront
any conict or cyclical conict as they do in the games for  under two-sided
framework. Thus (that is for serial dictatorship), it is easy to show that in
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium there exists a chooser that accepts the o¤er
because the better alternatives than this restricter agent are not achievable for
him.
Then, we delete the agents of this pair from the preference prole and the
Borda ranking. In the second stage of the game, we assign the best agent among
remains in the Borda ranking as the restricter. Then, we run our mechanism.
And, so on.
Now, we demonstrate the mechanism  with an example.
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Example 13 We will study R2 in Example 11.
R2 =
a b c d e f B(R2)
b c d a a b ab
c d a b b a c
d a b c c c d
e e f f d d ef
f f e e f e
Since there is tie between a and b, we randomly choose one of them.
Firstly, let us pick a as the restricter. Firstly, b is called to make a choice. If
he accepts the o¤er, then he forms the pair (a; b). In the second stage c becomes
the restricter. d is called for an o¤er and d accepts the o¤er since a and b are
deleted from the prole and so there is no better mate remained. Then, he forms
the pair (c; d). The nal pair (e; f) is automatically formed. Now, let us assume
that b rejects the o¤er in the rst step of the rst stage. Then, in the second
step of the rst stage a o¤ers to c. If c rejects the o¤er, then d will be called
in the third step and surely he will accept the o¤er which means c will loose his
chance for both of a and d. So, c accepts the o¤er and forms the pair (a; c).
In the second stage, b will be the restricter and he o¤ers to d. d will denitely
accept and form the pair (b; d). And, the last pair is (e; f). Now, let us back
to the beginning of the rst stage. If b accepts the o¤er of a, he forms the pair
(a; b). If he rejects as o¤er, then he forms the pair (b; d). Since, b prefers d
over a, he rejects the o¤er of a at the rst stage and so we end up with matching
 = f(a; c); (b; d); (e; f)g, which is the only stable matching for R2.
Secondly, let us pick b as the restricter of the rst stage. It is easy to show
that for c rejecting bs o¤er is a dominant strategy and we end up with the same
matching .
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Example 13 showed that mechanism  nds a stable matching for R2. From
Theorem 8 in section 3:1, this result is not unexpected. R2 has a stable matching
and our mechanism nds it.
But, what about R1, the example described by Gale and Shapley? What do
we observe if we apply our mechanism to some prole that does not have any
stable matching?
Example 14 We will study R1.
R1 =
a b c d B(R1)
b c a c c
c a b b b
d d d a a
d
In the rst stage, c will be the restricter. a is called to make a decision.
If a accepts the o¤er, he forms the pair (a; c). Then, the other pair will be
(b; d). If a rejects, then b will be called. Denitely b accpets the o¤er and forms
(b; c). Then, the other pair will automatically be (a; d). So, at the beginning of
the stage, if a accepts the o¤er, then he matches with c. If a rejects, then his
mate will be d. Since a prefers c over d, he accepts the o¤er of c at the rst
stage of the game. Then, we end up with matching 2 = f(a; c); (b; d)g, which
is unstable.
We applied mechanism  to R1 and we ended up with an unstable matching.
This result is not a surprise; we knew that there is no stable matching for this
prole. The unexpected point is the behaviour of our mechanism. In section
3:1, Theorem 8 (Theorem 13 in Evci (2014)) shows that  is a stable mechanism;
it always nds a stable matching. The surprise part is that as if there was some
stable matching for R1, the procedure was very smooth. But, it gave an ustable
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matching in the end. Then, what is the mystery of R1? We will answer this
question later in this section.
Now, we shall work on another example.
Example 15 Let N = fa; b; c; d; e; fg be the set boys with preference prole R3,
R3 =
a b c d e f B(R3)
c c d a a b a
b d a c b a c
d a b b c c b
e e f f d d d
f f e e f e ef
In the rst stage, a will be the restricter. c is called to make a decision.
If c accepts the o¤er, he forms the pair (a; c). In the second stage b becomes
the restricter. d is called for an o¤er and d accepts the o¤er since a is deleted
from the prole and so there is no better mate remained. Then, he forms the
pair (b; d). The nal pair (e; f) is automatically formed. And, we end up with
matching x = f(a; c); (b; d); (e; f)g.
Now, let us assume that c rejects the o¤er in the rst stage. Then, a o¤ers
to b in the second step of the rst stage. If b accepts the o¤er, he forms the
pair (a; b). In the second stage c becomes the restricter. Then, c o¤ers to d
and d accepts the o¤er since a is deleted from the prole. Then, he forms the
pair (c; d). The nal pair (e; f) is automatically formed. Then, we end up with
matching y = f(a; b); (c; d); (e; f)g.
If b rejects the o¤er in the second step of the rst stage, then d will be called
and surely he will denitely accept the o¤er and forms the pair (a; d). In the
second stage c becomes the restricter. Then, c o¤ers to b and b denitely accepts
the o¤er. Then, he forms the pair (b; c). The nal pair (e; f) is automatically
formed. Then, we end up with matching z = f(a; d); (b; c); (e; f)g.
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In the second step of the rst stage (after c rejects as o¤er), if b accepts
as o¤er, we end up with y. If he rejects as o¤er, we end up with z. Since
zRby, b rejects the o¤er of a.
In the rst step of the rst stage, if c accepts as o¤er, we end up with x.
If c rejects as o¤er, we end up with z. Since xRcz, c accepts the o¤er by a.
Hence, we end up with matching x, which is unstable for R3 since it is
blocked by (c; d).
We applied our mechanism  to R3 and we got an unstable matching. Is R3
one of the preference proles which do not have any stable solution?
The answer is "No!". R3 has absolutely and only one stable matching and
it is y.
As Evci (2014) has stated and proved, the mechanism  is stable.  is
stronger than , since there is only one queue and the chooser agents never
experience any conict. Then, why cannot  end up with a/the stable matching
while there exist some?
The denition below will help us to gure out the reason.
Denition 16 Let N be a set of agents. Let R be a preference prole and B(R)
is the corresponding Borda ranking. Let M  N be a proper subset of N . The
preference prole R^ of M is constructed by deleting the agents i 2 N=M in
R. Namely, R^ is the prole of M Puried from Irrelevant Alternatives
(PIA) of N=M and B(R^) is the corresponding Borda ranking.
In the next example, we will examine R3 with puried Borda ranking.
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Example 17 R^3 =
a b c d e f B(R3) B(R^3)
c c d a a b a c
b d a c b a c ad
d a b b c c b b
e e f f d d d ef
f f e e f e ef
In R3, agents e and f are the worst alternatives for the rest of the society
and for each other they are same. If we purify R3 by excluding e and f , we get
the relationships of fa; b; c; dg with each other, as seen in prole Rfa;b;c;dg3 below,
Rfa;b;c;dg3 =
a b c d B(R^fa;b;c;dg3 )
c c d a c
b d a c ad
d a b b b
The comparison of B(R3) and B(R^3) tells us that eventhough a is not the
most favorite member of the set fa; b; c; dg, the support from an "irrelevant" set
fe; fg makes him the best of the prole, which falsies the result of the game.
The fake position of a makes him get a better mate which leads the game to an
unstable solution.
If we start the game with a, then we get x = f(a; c); (b; d); (e; f)g. On the
other hand, starting the game with c gives y = f(a; b); (c; d); (e; f)g, which is
the only stable matching for R3.
Now, we will check the case for R2 with puried ranking.
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Example 18 R^2 =
a b c d e f B(R2) B(R^2)
b c d a a b ab abcd
c d a b b a c ef
d a b c c c d
e e f f d d ef
f f e e f e
Since B(R2)s top cycle fa; bg is included by the one fa; b; c; dg of B(R^2),
R2 with unpuried Borda ranking gave the stable matching. It is easy to show
that starting the game with c or d would give the same (only) stable matching.
Now, we will examine prole R1, the example described by Gale and Shapley,
but with puried orderings.
Example 19 R^1 =
a b c d B(R1) B(R^1)
b c a c c abc
c a b b b d
d d d a a
d
Since there is a cycle between fa; b; cg, we randomly pick one of the agents
and assign him as the restricter. If we start with a, we end up with 1 =
f(a; b); (c; d)g: Starting with b gives 3 = f(a; d); (b; c)g. And, nally if c is the
restricter of the rst stage, the game reaches 2 = f(a; c); (b; d)g. As we have
already said, none of them is stable.
From above example, the following question arises; what is the stability
condition of the roommate problem (in terms of )?
Tan (1991) already stated the stability condition for the roommate problem.
The following theorem provides the necessary and su¢ cient condition of stability
in our game scenario.
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Theorem 20 Let N be a society and R^ be their preference prole with puried
ordering. The prole R does not have any stable matching if and only if in the
game for R^, mechanism  confronts a top cycle with odd number of agents in a
subgame.
Proof. ((=). Let M  N be a set of agents of a cycle with odd number of
cardinality (2k  1). Every agent prefers other agents in the cycle to the agents
outside of the cycle. From the structure of the game and the cycles, (2k   2)
number of agents of M match with each other. So, one of them forms a pair
with an agent from the bottom set. The existence of an agent in the bottom
set is guaranteed by the number of agents in the set N , that is Card(N) = 2n.
Let i 2 M be that agent and j 2 N=M be his mate. From the denition of a
Borda top cycle, it is clear lRij where 8l 2M=fig . And, again from denition
of a cycle, there is an agent k 2 M=fig such that iRk(k). Otherwise, agents
of M would not construct a full cycle. So, the pair (k; i) blocks the matching.
(=)). We suppose that R does not have any stable matching and there is
no cycle with odd number of agents in any subgame of . We will show that
this leads to a contradiction.
Firstly, let us assume that there is no cycle at all. So, B(R^) is a one-ranking
sequence of agents. Let (i; j) be a blocking pair. Without loss of generality,
let us assume i has a higher ranking than j does in B(R^). Since (i; j) blocks
the matching, i has a mate k such that jRik and also j has a mate l such that
iRj l. (i; j) being a blocking pair means that until js turn, i has not been taken.
Since, we have (j; l), j has not chosen any agent until his turn for i, because
better agents are not achievable for him. And, nally, when it is his turn, he
does not choose i and in a later stage he matches with l. Eventhough j has a
chance, he does not choose i, which contradicts to the rationality axiom.
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Secondly, let us assume that the game consists of cycle(s) with even number
of agents. From the game scenario of  and the denition of a (top Borda) cycle,
in such cycles agents match with other in the same cycle in the way the tie is
broken. This contradicts to instability.
Finally, if the game is combination of two above cases, same arguments work.
The nal topic of this paper is multi stability. As Knuth (1976) showed that
for the roommate problem some preference proles have more than one stable
matching like for the marriage problem. In the following pages we will analyze
multi stability.
Next example is on a prole with multi stability and the outcome of mech-
anism  for this prole.
Example 21 Let N = fa; b; c; dg be any set of boys with the prole R4,
R^4 =
a b c d B(R4) B(R^
fa;b;cg
4 ) B(R^
fa;b;dg
4 ) B(R^
fa;c;dg
4 ) B(R^
fb;c;dg
4 )
b d a c abcd a b c d
c a d b b d a c
d c b a c a d b
N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of all possible matchings, where
1 = f(a; b); (c; d)g,
2 = f(a; c); (b; d)g,
3 = f(a; d); (b; c)g.
As seen from the table above, prole R^4 has no xed puried Borda ranking
like R^3 does. So, any agent could be the restricter of the rst stage.
For prole R4, the set of stable matchings is f1; 2g. It is easy to show that
if we start the game with b or c, we end up with matching 1. On the other
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hand, starting with a or d gives us matching 2. This is because of the cycle
conict between the sets fa; dg and fb; cg.
In the existence of multi stability, we need to run the mechanism for di¤erent
(all) puried orderings in order to nd all of stable matchings for the prefer-
ence prole. Giving priorities in Borda ranking to di¤erent agents changes the
outcome from one stable solution to another.
The reason of multi stability is, not surprisingly, the existence of the cyclical
conicts between two disjoint sets of agents. We refer to Evci (2014) for an
exhaustive analysis of cycles.
In the game scenario of  of Evci (2014), choosers have to decide simulta-
neously at the same step. Having the same decision of the agents in a cycle
generates two stable matchings. At such nodes, Nash equilibrium is a binding
criterion for the choosers in cycles.
In the game scenario of  on the other hand, cyclical conicts are broken
since the game path (tree) has only one single ranking. The choosers are called
one by one to make a decision and so they do not experience any cyclical conict.
Therefore,  generates a bias for the chooser agents and the outcome is always
chooser-optimal, as also seen in Example 21.
Evci (2014) also proposed a renement mechanism  of his original mech-
anism . While  implements the full set of stable matchings for any given
preference prole,  partitions the full domain of preference proles. For some
proles the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings; for some
proles, it gives a proper subset of stable matchings and for some of them, it
induces (Chooser-Optimal) Gale and Shapleys algorithm. Thus, while mecha-
nism  generates "partial bias" for the chooser side as compared to mechanism
, mechanism  generates "full bias".
Now, we state our most general result.
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Theorem 22 Let N be a set of agents and R be their preference prole. Let
B(R^) be the corresponding puried ordering(s). The mechanism  dened over
R^ and B(R^), formally
 : (R; B(R^))  ! N ,
implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability and
gives a Pareto E¢ cient matching for the instances of instability.
Proof. The stability part has been proved by the examples, claims, proposition
and theorems so far.
Pareto e¢ ciency is proved from the denition of a cycle with odd number
of agents. In a cycle, increasing the "payo¤" of an agent, not a member of the
blocking pair, reduces the payo¤ of another agent.
Secondly, we shall specically analyze the blocking pair. Let (i; j) be the
blocking pair such that i is matched with agent k from the bottom set. Re-
matching of agents in a way that in the new matching we have (i; j), such that
jRik and j is a member of the top cycle, generates a new blocking pair since an
another agent, say l, who is another member of the top cycle, will be matched
with k. And, this means the payo¤ of agent l reduces. Hence, the matching
from the procedure is Pareto e¢ cient.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a simple mechanism for the roommate problem. The
mechanism is a renement of the mechanism described in Evci (2014). While
applying his mechanism to this problem, we benet from a famous Social Choice
Rule (SCR), the Borda rule in welfare function form. Then, we analyze the
e¤ect of this SWF in two scenarios by simply seperating the raw and puried
orderings.
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First of all, as we show, the mechanism  is quite successful under the
puried orderings in checking stability for any given preference prole. The
success of  for the raw orderings depends on whether it coincides with the
puried orderings or not. As long as the top set of the raw orderings is a subset
of the one generated under puried orderings, we end up with a/the stable
matching.
We have showed that in the absence of stability, the mechanism  ends up
with a Pareto e¢ cient matching.
And nally, we have showed that  is also an easy and strong mechanism to
nd all stable matchings for a given preference prole in the existence of multi
stability.
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